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The election of Democrats alone is not enough to ensure gay
rights
Although Congressmen are elected to represent their districts and states, they will occasionally
defy majority opinion to support the rights of a minority group. Drawing on data from House
Democrats that voted against the popular Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Benjamin G. Bishin
and Charles Anthony Smith  determine that favorable district composition, membership in the
Congressional Black Caucus, and competitive elections were associated with opposition to
DOMA. They conclude that the difficulty of passing legislation to protect minority rights leaves the
courts as the best option for such advancement.
At the time the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) passed in the United States, a majority in
every state and all but four congressional districts strongly opposed gay marriage. Support was
the strongest in New York State, with 36% in favor, while nationally only 27% of Americans
supported gay marriage. This widespread opposition provides an excellent opportunity to
investigate the conditions under which legislators might ignore public opinion to support the rights
of a minority group. In the Senate, all 14 members who bucked public opinion to vote against
DOMA were Democrats and in the House, 66 of the 67 House members that voted against DOMA
were Democrats. Three of those House Democrats were from districts that supported marriage equality. The only
Republican to vote against the bill, Steve Gunderson (WI-3), had been outed as gay by a conservative Republican
on the House floor during the debate.
Because the Republicans were
virtually unified, their votes
provide us with little leverage, so
we looked at the votes of House
Democrats to understand when a
legislator might defy public
opinion. Specifically, we
examined the relationship
between House Democrats’
DOMA vote and measures of
constituency support for gay
marriage, the size of the district’s
evangelical and gay populations
and whether legislators faced a
competitive challenge, as
indicated by a victory margin of
fewer than 10 points, in the 1994
election. Additional constituency
characteristics we examined
included the size of the black and
Hispanic populations, the
percentage of Democrats in the
district and whether the legislator is a member of the congressional Black or Hispanic Caucus. As Figure 1 below
shows, we found that public support for gay marriage, the size of the LGBT population, whether the legislator is a
member of the Congressional Black Caucus, and the percent of the district that identifies as Democratic, were all
significantly associated with opposition to DOMA. In fact, only the size of the black population in the district is
associated with increased support for DOMA. Interestingly, we also found that that legislators from more
competitive districts were less likely to support DOMA.
Figure 1 – Probability that House Democrats vote for DOMA and independent variables
Judging substantive significance by the likelihood that a particular factor might lead a legislator to change their
vote, both public opinion and the size of the gay population have large influences on Democrats’ vote on DOMA. In
contrast, Democrats appear less sensitive to the size of the Evangelical community. The bottom right panel
indicates that while there are large differences in the behavior of legislators from safe versus competitive districts,
Democrats from competitive districts are more likely to buck public opinion to oppose DOMA. This effect is so
large, in fact, that when moving from a safe to a competitive district, legislators go from having about an 80%
chance of supporting DOMA when safe to an almost even chance (51%) when competitive.
At first glance, given the public’s historic opposition to gay marriage, the fact that public opinion performs so well
might be positively viewed by advocates of minority rights. After all, the last decade has seen dramatic increases
in public support for gay marriage. Our research suggests, however, that shifting public opinion alone is not likely
to be sufficient to enact changes in this policy area given the intense opposition by religious conservatives and the
relative ease with which legislation can be impeded. After all, there is no reason to expect that Republicans would
not shirk majority district opinion to support their subconstituency and party positions just as many Democrats did
on DOMA.
It is likely not enough, however, to simply elect large numbers of Democrats. While Democrats today are much
more likely to support gay rights, some still vote against expanding such rights. Instead, when legislative action is
required to enact or protect gay marriage, shifts in public opinion also must be accompanied by the election of
large numbers of Democrats, since they are most likely to both to shirk opposing public opinion, and to support gay
rights themselves, and their election necessarily displaces Republicans who seem more likely to oppose public
opinion in order to take anti-gay positions.
The degree to which legislatures protect the rights of minorities also seems to partly depend on who holds power
in them. While the election of Democrats alone is not enough to ensure gay rights, in cases like California,
Vermont, and New Hampshire, where Democrats have large majorities, legislatures regularly consider and
support bills advancing the rights of gays and lesbians. Consequently, the election of Democrats seems to be a
necessary but insufficient prerequisite for progress. It is worth emphasizing, however, that Republican control is
more likely to lead to the consideration and passage of anti-gay legislation, as in the US Congress, with DOMA.
Of those Republican legislators who cast votes on the bill we examine in this paper, for instance, less than 0.5%
(1/278) voted to support gay marriage.
Given these difficulties with using the legislature to protect minorities, in the short term, it appears that courts
continue to offer the best venue for the advancement of rights.
This article is based on the paper “When Do Legislators Defy Popular Sovereignty? Testing Theories of Minority
Representation using DOMA,” which was published in Political Research Quarterly 66(4): 794-803.
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